



HOMMUNC XXXVIII

OCTOBER 21ST, 2023
38TH ANNUAL

**HORACE MANN MODEL UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE**

DISEC

LILY WENDER
CHAIR



HO MMUNC XXXVIII

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| LETTER FROM THE SECRETARIAT | 3 |
| COMMITTEE PROCEDURE: | 4 |
| TOPIC 1- WEAPONIZATION OF SMALLPOX | 5 |
| Overview | 5 |
| History | 7 |
| Current Situation | 8 |
| Possible Solutions | 9 |
| Bloc Positions | 11 |
| Questions to Consider | 13 |
| TOPIC 2 - ELECTION INTEGRITY | 14 |
| Overview | 14 |
| History | 15 |
| Current Situation | 17 |
| Possible Solutions | 19 |
| Bloc Positions | 21 |
| Questions to Consider | 22 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 24 |

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Nate Chiang
Lily Wender

Secretaries-General

Isabelle Kim
**Director-General of
HoMMUNC**

Asha Tandon
Andrew Ziman
**Under-Secretary-
General of Training**

Josh Anderman
Julia Bouchut
Andrew Doft
**Under-Secretary-
General of Research**

Rain Li
**Under-Secretary-
General of
HoMMUNC**

Lili Frangenberg
Jared Margulis
Ahaan Modi
Jacqueline Shih
**Conference
Coordinators**

Gabby Solmson
**Chair of the
Junior Board**

Dr. Steven Fabian
Faculty Advisor

DEAR DELEGATES,

It is our pleasure to welcome you to Horace Mann's 38th Annual Model United Nations Conference, HoMMUNC XXXVIII! Since 1985, HoMMUNC has brought together future world leaders to discuss pressing global issues. We hope that this day can be full of meaningful and didactic debate, discourse, and collaboration. We are honored to be able to organize this conference for all of you, and hopefully provide you with an enjoyable Model UN experience. We hope you are as excited as we are!

We encourage you to deeply explore your topics and arrive at HoMMUNC prepared to engage with others and involve yourself in debate, regardless of your age or experience with Model UN. Each committee is composed of a diverse group of delegates and will address a unique set of topics ranging from protecting freedom of the press to the weaponization of smallpox and the preservation of indigenous culture. We challenge you to delve deep into research and think creatively about how to address these complicated issues. Take this opportunity to learn as much as you can, work collaboratively, and be a leader in your committee.

Model United Nations has played a massive role in our lives over the past three years, and we are thrilled to share it with all of you. It has been our pleasure preparing HoMMUNC XXXVIII along with our dedicated junior and senior staff over the past six months. We hope you have an enriching and enjoyable experience at the conference!

Sincerely,

NATE CHIANG AND LILY WENDER

Secretaries-General of HoMMUNC XXXVIII

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE:

Roll Call: at the beginning of every committee session, the chair will take attendance, and every delegate must respond “present.” If you are late coming to committee, send a note to the dais to let them know you are present.

Motions: used to open and close debate, decide to move to voting procedure, to propose a speakers list, moderated or unmoderated caucus. The chair will entertain several motions at one time, then will have all delegates vote on each motion in order of most to least disruptive, and the motion with the majority passes.

Speaker’s List: a type of debate used to start committee, often meant to set the agenda, in which the chair would create a list of speakers.

Moderated Caucus: another form of debate, used most often during

committee, that has a set time, speaking time, and specific topic to debate. Your chair will call upon countries to speak. When a delegate wishes to speak, they will raise their placard when told.

Unmoderated Caucus: a time when the rules of formal debate are suspended, during which delegates can leave their seats. This time is used for delegates to build blocs and write draft resolutions.

Resolutions: require a set number of sponsors who worked on drafting the resolution, and a list of signatories who would like to see the resolution debated. Resolutions are presented by the sponsors of the draft resolution, after which a Q&A session will be held.

TOPIC 1- WEAPONIZATION OF SMALLPOX

Overview

The weaponization of smallpox is a grave concern to the international community. Smallpox, a highly contagious and deadly disease, was officially eradicated in 1980 through a successful global vaccination campaign led by the World Health Organization (WHO). However, there are still concerns about the potential use of smallpox as a biological weapon. This background guide aims to provide delegates with an overview of the history, risks, international efforts, and potential countermeasures related to the weaponization of smallpox.

Smallpox, when weaponized, is a type of biological weapon. Biological weapons are a class of unconventional weapons that employ deadly microorganisms, toxins, or infectious agents to harm or kill living

organisms. These weapons can take the form of bacteria, viruses, fungi, or toxins derived from plants and animals. The potential for mass destruction and casualties makes them a significant concern. Some notorious examples include anthrax, smallpox, and botulism. Biological weapons are attractive to both state and non-state actors due to their low cost, ease of production, and ability to cause widespread panic. International agreements like the Biological Weapons Convention seek to curb their use. Still, the threat remains, with advancements in biotechnology and genetic engineering raising new concerns about the development and deployment of even more potent and unpredictable biological agents. Preventing the misuse of biological weapons requires ongoing vigilance, strong international cooperation, and robust biosafety and biosecurity measures.

Biological weapons, including smallpox, pose a multifaceted and severe danger to humanity. Firstly, their contagious nature can lead to rapid and uncontrolled outbreaks, overwhelming healthcare systems and causing widespread panic. Moreover, these diseases often have high mortality rates, leading to a significant loss of life. Their potential for long-lasting and unpredictable effects on survivors, including chronic health issues, further compounds the danger. Secondly, biological weapons can be used secretly, making it difficult to detect their deployment until symptoms manifest. This covert nature allows for surprise attacks on civilian populations, military forces, or critical infrastructure, with devastating consequences.

Additionally, biological weapons can be tailored or engineered for enhanced virulence or antibiotic resistance, rendering

conventional treatments and vaccines ineffective. This adaptability and the potential for genetically modified pathogens raise concerns about the creation of superbugs that could be difficult to contain or eradicate. Furthermore, the psychological impact of biological weapons is substantial, as the fear of exposure and uncertainty about the extent of an outbreak can lead to widespread panic and social disruption.

Lastly, the dual-use nature of biotechnology means that advancements in the life sciences, intended for beneficial purposes, could be exploited to develop more potent biological weapons. To counter these dangers, international cooperation, robust biosafety and biosecurity measures, and strict adherence to disarmament agreements are essential to prevent the use of biological weapons and mitigate their devastating effects on humanity.

History

The use of smallpox as a biological weapon dates all the way back to the 14th century when Tartar forces catapulted the corpses of smallpox victims into besieged towns to weaken and destroy entrapped defenders. Similar tactics were then used during the French and Indian Wars between 1754 and 1767.

However, this time it was used by the commander of Fort Pitt who distributed blankets that had been used by smallpox patients with the intent of initiating outbreaks among Native Americans. This tactic proved successful and an epidemic broke out, killing more than 50% of the infected tribes.

Smallpox, caused by the variola virus, was one of human history's deadliest and most contagious diseases. In the 20th century, several nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, pursued research into the military

applications of smallpox. During the late 1930s, the Soviet Union began growing smallpox on the chorioallantoic membrane of developing chicken embryos. These efforts primarily focused on enhancing the virus's virulence, developing resistance to vaccines, and creating methods for mass production.

During the Cold War, several global superpowers invested heavily in bioweaponry research, and smallpox was a prime candidate due to its high lethality and potential for mass destruction. The United States, for example, initiated a program called "Operation Whitecoat" to investigate the feasibility of using smallpox as a bioweapon. The Soviet Union, likewise, explored similar avenues.

The international community recognized the dire implications of smallpox's weaponization, leading to efforts to counteract this threat. In

1969, the United Nations adopted the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a landmark treaty that sought to outlaw the development, production, and acquisition of biological weapons, including smallpox. The BWC became instrumental in discouraging countries from pursuing smallpox weaponization. Furthermore, eradicating natural smallpox in 1980, a monumental achievement spearheaded by the World Health Organization (WHO), eliminated one potential source of the virus for bioweapon purposes.

However, despite these efforts and subsequent advances in global biosecurity, the specter of smallpox as a bioweapon remains a concern. The history of its weaponization serves as a sobering reminder of the need for international cooperation, transparency, and stringent safeguards to ensure that

such devastating diseases are never used as tools of destruction.

Current Situation

Currently, smallpox remains eradicated, and there have been no naturally occurring cases since 1977. The last known samples of the variola virus are held in highly secure laboratories in the United States and Russia. However, the possibility of smallpox reemerging through natural means or deliberate actions is a continuing concern, and global efforts persist to prevent such an occurrence.

The United Nations, primarily through the World Health Organization (WHO), has played a crucial role in the secure storage and handling of the remaining smallpox virus stocks. The WHO's Intensified Smallpox Eradication Program monitors the situation and ensures that the virus is only retained for essential research and vaccine development purposes. Currently,

only two laboratories are approved to have the smallpox virus for research: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States and the Russian State Centre for Research on Virology and Biotechnology in the Russian Federation. However, there is a growing concern that some countries made the virus into weapons, which may have fallen into the hands of terrorists or other people with criminal intentions unbeknown to the WHO.

To combat the concern of the potential existence of smallpox beyond just approved facilities, the WHO guides member states on smallpox preparedness and response, including vaccination strategies and containment measures. Moreover, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) continues to be a linchpin in preventing the weaponization of smallpox and other biological agents. The BWC has held regular review

conferences and meetings to strengthen its provisions and encourage compliance among member states.

The international community, with the United Nations and its specialized agencies at the forefront, remains vigilant in safeguarding against the potential resurgence of smallpox, whether through natural outbreaks or as a result of bioterrorism. The lessons from history and the possibility that smallpox can be genetically modified to have new pathogenic characteristics that are resistant to current vaccines underscore the critical importance of maintaining strong biosecurity measures and promoting peaceful, cooperative uses of biological research for the benefit of humanity.

Possible Solutions

Although smallpox was eradicated in 1980, it remains a

potential agent of biowarfare and bioterrorism. When thinking of solutions, it will be important for delegates to consider both the further prevention of the use of smallpox as a bioweapon and measures to put in place in case a breakout does occur. Beyond the solutions listed below, delegates should be creative, thinking of new and innovative solutions to this complex topic.

Many models have been developed in the past to plan for emergency responses, but all leave many uncertainties, and no model can truly predict what a smallpox outbreak would look like and how it could be addressed. However, it is clear from reviewing different scenarios that early detection, isolation of infected individuals, surveillance of contacts, and a focused, selective vaccination program are the essential items of an effective control program.

The efficacy of such a program, however, depends on the level of education, both in the public as well as within the medical community. Education of health care professionals should permit early detection of infected individuals and allow for prompt initiation of adequate first steps to contain the approaching epidemic. Advanced planning for isolation of infected individuals, both in their homes as well as in hospitals, will be critical to prevent the outbreak from further expansion.

The success in conquering the threat of a reemerging smallpox epidemic will rest on the availability of adequate supplies of vaccines and other medications necessary for treatment. To ensure an effective and relatively inexpensive safeguard for such a tragedy, it is necessary to provide an adequate stockpile of vaccines. Currently, most nations around the world do not possess this

stockpile, including both developing and developed nations. It will be critical to have a method in place to quickly create and disseminate a plethora of smallpox vaccines to the general public.

Additionally, there is a large threat that smallpox could be genetically engineered to become antibiotic-resistant or even render current vaccines ineffective. It will be important for more research to be conducted on possible modifications to smallpox to ensure that no matter the strain, vaccines are readily available and a method of treatment exists, ensuring the fewest casualties possible.

Bloc Positions

The Global Health Security

Coalition:

Member States: United States, European Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and several African nations.

Member states of the Global Health Security Coalition believe in strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and have said “We reaffirm our commitment to the Biological Weapons Convention. We call on all states to comply fully with the BWC's provisions, including prohibiting smallpox as a biological weapon and to support efforts to strengthen the treaty's verification mechanisms.” Additionally, member states have urged other nations to destroy any smallpox they still may possess given it can pose an unnecessary risk to global security and health. The Global Health Security Coalition has also called for international cooperation which would include collaboration in “capacity building, technology sharing, and information exchange to enhance global preparedness against smallpox. This includes supporting developing countries in building their healthcare and surveillance capacities.” Finally, member states are committed to

supporting research and development efforts to “improve diagnostics, antiviral treatments, and vaccines for smallpox,” including promoting access to medical countermeasures for all nations.

The Non-Proliferation Coalition:

Member States: Russia, China, India, Brazil, and several Middle Eastern nations.

Members of the Non-Proliferation Coalition also adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), viewing it as the cornerstone of international efforts against biological weapons. All states’ parties must comply with their obligations under the BWC. These nations have also acknowledged the security concerns that some states may have, given the potential for the illicit acquisition of smallpox by non-state actors or hostile states. They understand that it is essential to address these concerns while upholding the principles of disarmament. Member

nations have proposed the establishment of enhanced verification mechanisms under the BWC to ensure transparency and compliance with smallpox-related obligations. These mechanisms would have to be implemented with the cooperation of all state parties. Regarding a global response, members of the Non-Proliferation Coalition have called for a coordinated global response to any confirmed use of smallpox as a biological weapon. They believe the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should play a central role in addressing such situations and taking measures to restore international peace and security. Finally, member states have pledged to support capacity-building initiatives in developing countries to improve their abilities to prevent, detect, and respond to smallpox outbreaks.

Questions to Consider

1. Have any historical examples of smallpox being used as a biological weapon occurred in your nation? How can these historical cases inform our discussions on the contemporary threat?
2. How can nations enhance their preparedness to respond to a smallpox outbreak, whether it occurs naturally or as a result of weaponization? What measures should be taken at the national and international levels?
3. How does your delegation view the role of the BWC in preventing the weaponization of smallpox? Are there specific provisions or measures your delegation wishes to emphasize or propose for strengthening the treaty?
4. What is your delegation's stance on the remaining smallpox stockpiles? Should they be retained for research and vaccine development purposes, or should they be destroyed completely? What verification mechanisms should be in place for stockpile destruction?
5. How can countries cooperate more effectively to prevent the weaponization of smallpox? What initiatives or programs does your delegation support to improve international cooperation in this regard?
6. Does your delegation have specific security concerns related to smallpox, especially in the context of non-state actors or rogue states? How can these concerns be addressed without compromising disarmament efforts?

TOPIC 2 - ELECTION INTEGRITY

Overview

Although there is no one clear, universal definition of electoral integrity, it is often explained as synonymous with a “good election.”

The integrity of nations’ voting systems is critical to the functioning of society, with the right to vote in a free and fair election being a fundamental civil right. Many, if not all, citizens of nations with functioning democracies worldwide depend on it. Election integrity stands as the basis of true democracy, giving people around the world the confirmation of a secure election and the assurance that their votes and opinions matter.

A major contribution to the ongoing debate on the definition of electoral integrity is the *Report of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide*.

This report defines electoral integrity

as "any election based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements and is professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle.”

Electoral integrity allows for peaceful resolution of conflict, confidence in election results, and legitimacy.

Election integrity also encourages open dialogue, debate, and information sharing among leaders and the public.

The commission acknowledges that electoral integrity “at its root” is a political problem compared to a technical one. The integrity of elections depends on public confidence in electoral and political processes.

To ensure public confidence in elections, inclusivity, transparency, and accountability are fundamental. As a result, election officials, judges, and courts must have independence that politicians respect. Citizens deserve to feel confident that their votes are

accurately counted and protected from cyber-attacks and corruption. The Commission’s report mentioned the definition of “election with integrity.” It notes that this integrity refers to “incorruptibility or a firm adherence to a code of moral values.” This suggests that it means adherence to democratic principles, generally referring to “soundness or an unimpaired condition.’ The commission implies that to speak about an election with integrity means to conduct competently and professionally. Additionally, the commission discusses the completeness of an election, which suggests the connection with elections and the soundness and ethical practice throughout the entire electoral cycle rather than just on election day itself.

History

Election integrity has been an important issue since the formation of democratic nations. Although there were fewer ways to interfere with elections before the digital age, unfair

elections have existed for centuries. For example, certain groups of people, particularly women and people of color, were disenfranchised, meaning elections did not consider more than half of nations’ populations. In the United States, despite white men having the right to vote since the early 1700s, women could not vote until 1920. Even when women and people of color were given the right to vote, barriers were put in place to make it harder. This included certain requirements for education or identification that were largely unavailable for black Americans. Since then, the threats to election security have changed, particularly with the rise of the digital age, but they are now more pressing than ever before.

Although the United Nations understands that the responsibility for organizing free and fair elections lies within the purview of member nations, they have helped more than 100 nations that have requested United Nations electoral assistance since 1991.

During the 1990s, the United Nations observed, supervised, or conducted landmark elections and popular consultations in Timor-Leste, South Africa, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Cambodia. More recently, the Organization has provided crucial technical and logistical assistance in milestone elections in many countries, including Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

In 1991, the Secretary-General designated the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs as a focal point for electoral assistance matters, with the endorsement of the General Assembly. Since then, the institutional arrangements for United Nations electoral assistance and the entities involved have greatly grown and evolved. For example, in March 1994, the United Nations Observation Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was carried out, and peacekeepers were

sent to voting locations to ensure voting equity and noninterference. A similar mission, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), was carried out in October 2005 in Monrovia, Liberia. In addition to overseeing the voting process, UN peacekeepers were sent to help count ballots after the polls closed, ensuring everyone's votes were counted equally.

Although there has not been widespread legislation by the UN on securing elections internationally, many individual nations have taken steps to protect the integrity of their elections. For example, The United States government passed the Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999, which banned contributions by foreign nationals to all campaign-related disbursements, outlawed any person organized under or created by U.S. or State law from making donations or disbursements to any election candidate, and strengthened restrictions on inaccurate

information regarding voting and elections.

Beyond nations taking steps to increase election security, individuals and groups have also worked to do so by forming the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity (TCEI). The TCEI seeks to fill a critical gap by fostering a global and collective approach to curb the ongoing wave of election interference and raise awareness among the public and governments about the risks of interference. Since its launch in 2018, the TCEI has established itself as an essential global voice and player on the risks and solutions to combat foreign election meddling. The TCEI brings together more than a dozen eminent persons from backgrounds in politics, media, and the private sector, chaired by former NATO Chief and Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and former US Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. The TCEI's main priorities are to "Monitor technological innovation and

promote policy solutions to address the challenge of foreign election meddling and malign synthetic media" and "Highlight the importance of media literacy initiatives in the fight against mis- and disinformation."

Current Situation

The Electoral Integrity Global Report from 2019 to 2021, conducted by researchers from the University of East Anglia (UEA) and the Royal Military College of Canada/Queen's University, found that the United States, previously designated as the world's leading democracy, is falling behind in election integrity. Election integrity in the United States of America was ranked 15th of the 29 countries in the Americas and was the lowest-ranked liberal democracy. The main areas of weakness in the USA are drawing the electoral boundaries, the results process, campaign finance, and voter registration.

In 2021, the Electoral Integrity dataset release 8.0 report was released,

revealing a comprehensive survey by more than 4,500 expert assessments that compared 480 parliamentary and presidential elections in 169 countries around the world and revealed which countries have the strongest elections and the parts of the electoral process that needed to be addressed and fixed. The report found that elections in Finland, Sweden, and Denmark were the most secure in the world. In Africa, Cape Verde had the greatest quality of electoral integrity. Taiwan, Canada, and New Zealand were also ranked first for their respective continents. However, electoral integrity in Russia has seen a large decline following the 2021 parliamentary elections. Only Belarus currently ranks lower in Europe. Finally, the report found that globally electoral integrity is lowest in Comoros, the Central African Republic, and Syria.

There have been major concerns about democratic backsliding in recent years, with a Summit for Democracy being launched by the United States

Department of State at the end of 2021 to “set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal and to tackle the greatest threats faced by democracies.”

Despite concerns about democratic backsliding, the Electoral Integrity dataset report found that there is little evidence for an aggregate decline in the quality of electoral integrity globally between 2012 and 2021. Instead, the problems are more specific to countries, with some seeing major changes, such as a sharp decline in the acceptance of the presidential election results in the United States, as demonstrated by the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol.

Currently, electoral finance is one of the weakest areas of the electoral cycle. The report found that publishing transparent financial accounts was the area where the world was struggling the most. Dr. Holly Ann Garnett, of the Royal Military College at Queen’s University in Canada, said: “Transparency in reporting on the

sources and uses of campaign funds is the first step towards reducing the barrier that money can be to participation as a candidate or representative, particularly of under-represented groups around the world.”

In modern elections, United Nations peacekeepers are vital in ensuring equity and noninterference. When done well, election observation detects ballot-box stuffing, voter suppression, and political violence. Observers’ presence at polling stations deters election-day fraud. Observers also provide public statements about election quality and offer recommendations on improving electoral processes. In 2023, more than 20 African countries are scheduled to go to the polls. It will be a busy year for observers who will be present at the majority of these elections.

Possible Solutions

Election integrity is a multifaceted issue and delegates must come up with comprehensive solutions

to address multiple sectors which can include voter education and engagement, transparent voter registration, secure voting infrastructure, robust identity verification, independent election monitoring, financial regulation campaigns, and a solid legal framework. Beyond just the solutions discussed below, delegates must come up with new and innovative solutions that can tackle all sectors of the complex problem of securing elections.

Education is one critical way to begin to secure elections around the world. Educating voters on their rights and responsibilities and raising awareness about the importance of informed voting would encourage public confidence and increase electoral integrity. A UN-monitored database could be created containing information about different nations’ elections. This database would be run by individual nations but monitored by the UN to ensure no misinformation or disinformation is disseminated.

Centralizing information about polling locations, candidates, and voting processes would make it easier for citizens to gather information and make informed decisions while voting without having to do extensive research. Education can also extend to schools through civic education courses or lectures that would instill a sense of responsibility among future voters. Individuals of all ages must understand the electoral process and receive the necessary education to prepare them for voting.

Transparent voter registration also stands as a clear step towards electoral integrity. It is critical to ensure accurate and up-to-date voter registration lists by implementing secure online voter registration systems and regularly updating voter rolls to remove ineligible voters. One way to secure voting infrastructure is through the use of modern, secure voting technology such as paper ballots, electronic voting machines with verifiable paper trails, or even

blockchain-based systems accessible to developed nations. Blockchain technology registers voters in a database and allows this information to be accessible to select government officials, this usage can secure electoral integrity throughout the entire electoral cycle.

In the past, solutions that have helped improve the integrity of our elections are often simple; these include retiring old and outdated voting machines, upgrading the technology we use, and moving towards employing paper ballots in every state. In addition, a requirement towards risk-limiting post-election audits of ballots to confirm that reported election results are accurate would improve electoral integrity. Ensuring paper back-ups of our voter registration databases and electronic voter rolls and eliminating the use of online voting all stand as simple solutions to improving electoral integrity.

Bloc Positions

European Union (EU): Since 2000, the EU has deployed over 200 Election Observation Missions (EOMs) in more than 75 countries. The EU's fundamental principles include the right to free and fair elections and the support and promotion of democracy worldwide. In December 2021, many European nations participated in a summit to learn more about the cybersecurity aspects of elections including the impact of cybersecurity when introducing new election technologies, the intersection between cybersecurity and disinformation, regional cooperation, and foreign interference. The EU remains committed to securing elections in Europe and endorsing and spreading democracy around the world.

Africa: In 2015, a report by the Electoral Integrity Project found that the degree of threats to electoral integrity is more severe in Africa when compared to the rest of the world. The

report also found that elections can fail long before election day actually occurs, so African delegations should focus on both election interference during elections but also prior to voting. Additionally, there are significant difficulties in African nations in regulating campaign finances which means it will be important to implement measures to track or better identify where donations to campaigns are coming from and whether or not they are legal.

Latin America: Latin America's use of social media as the primary channel for political engagement makes the region especially vulnerable to disinformation, which has been identified by the UN secretary-general António Guterres as a "precursor to atrocity crimes, including genocide." In 2022, Latin America reached 392.6 million social network users, second only to the Asia-Pacific region, with Facebook and TikTok as the top-performing platforms. It is also

estimated that over 90% of Latin American internet users use WhatsApp, which is known to disseminate disinformation. The popularization of encrypted messaging services like WhatsApp and Telegram presents a great challenge in monitoring and curtailing disinformation campaigns since there are very few fact-checking mechanisms that can break the encryption barrier. It will be particularly important for Latin American delegations to address the issue of disinformation when tackling the complex topic of election integrity.

Asia: A 2018 study by Max Grömping entitled *The Integrity of Elections in Asia: Policy Lessons from Expert Evaluations* sought out areas where the integrity of elections in Asia could be strengthened. He found that there were three principal ways to do so including curbing incumbent advantage enshrined in electoral laws regulating candidate registration and voting

district boundaries, introducing regulation of political finance to reduce the influence of money in elections, and increasing the transparency of the electoral process by encouraging nonpartisan domestic election monitoring and advocacy, as well as enhanced cooperation between civil society and election officials in the exchange of election information.

Questions to Consider

1. What is the structure of your nation's government? Are the leaders determined through elections and the will of the people?
2. Are there any methods implemented in your nation to ensure the security of national elections?
3. What are the biggest threats to election integrity around the world? What threats are the most pressing in your nation?

4. How can the UN create solutions that do not infringe on a nation's national sovereignty but can create meaningful enhancements to election security around the world?
5. How can technology be used to make elections safer and more secure?
6. How do you plan to fund all of your proposed solutions?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Topic 1 -

Alibek, Ken. "Smallpox: a disease and a weapon." *International Journal of Infectious Diseases*. Accessed August 30, 2023. [https://www.ijidonline.com/article/S1201-9712\(04\)00130-4/fulltext](https://www.ijidonline.com/article/S1201-9712(04)00130-4/fulltext).

Atlas, R. M. "The medical threat of biological weapons." *National Library of Medicine*. Accessed August 30, 2023. <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9800098/>.

"Biological Weapons." *World Health Organization*. Accessed August 30, 2023. https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1.

"Biological Weapons Convention." *United Nations*. Accessed August 30, 2023. <https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/>.

Meštrović, Tomislav. "Smallpox Biological Warfare." *News Medical Life Sciences*. Last modified August 23, 2018. Accessed August 30, 2023. <https://www.news-medical.net/health/Smallpox-Biological-Warfare.aspx>.

Riedel, Stefan. "Smallpox and Biological Warfare: A Disease Revisited." *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)* 18, no. 1 (2005): 13-20. Accessed August 31, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08998280.2005.11928026>.

"Smallpox." *CDC*. Last modified December 16, 20129. Accessed August 30, 2023. <https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/bioterrorism/public/threat.html#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20immediate%2C%20direct,their%20enemies%20with%20the%20disease>.

"Smallpox: a disease and a weapon." *International Journal of Infectious Diseases*. Last modified October 2004. Accessed August 30, 2023. [https://www.ijidonline.com/article/S1201-9712\(04\)00130-4/fulltext](https://www.ijidonline.com/article/S1201-9712(04)00130-4/fulltext).

"What are Biological Weapons?" *United Nations*. Accessed August 30, 2023. <https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/about/what-are-biological-weapons/>.

Topic 2 -

Andresen, Emilie. "Promoting Information Integrity in Elections." United Nations Development Program. Last modified October 10, 2022. Accessed August 31, 2023. <https://www.undp.org/policy-centre/oslo/news/promoting-information-integrity-elections>.

"Elections." United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. <https://dppa.un.org/en/elections>.

"Electoral Integrity Global Report 2019-2021." Electoral Integrity Project. <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/globalreport2019-2021>.

"Electoral Integrity Global Report 2023." Electoral Integrity Project. <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/global-report-2023>.

"Electoral Integrity in Africa 2015." Electoral Integrity Project. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31bebafe99c85dc9b/t/60478e1f213e6777af0de7d7/1615302181070/Electoral+Integrity+in+Africa.pdf>.

"EU Election Observation Missions." The Diplomatic Service of the European Union. Last modified August 7, 2023. Accessed August 31, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-election-observation-missions-1_en.

Heinmaa, Thomas. "Cybersecurity in Elections: Recent Developments in Europe - Online Discussion." IDEA. Last modified February 14, 2022. Accessed August 31, 2023. <https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/cybersecurity-elections-recent-developments-europe-online-discussion>.

Hernandez-Roy, Christopher, Rubi Bledsoe, and Gabriela Marma-Gutierrez. "Ensuring Information Integrity in Electoral Processes in the Americas." CSIS. Last modified July 28, 2023. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ensuring-information-integrity-electoral-processes-americas>.

"H.R.2668 - Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999." Congress. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/2668>.

"The Integrity of Elections in Asia: Policy Lessons Applied." International Foundation of Electoral Systems. Last modified November 26, 2018. Accessed August 31, 2023. <https://www.ifes.org/publications/integrity-elections-asia-policy-lessons-applied>.

Norris, Pippa. "Why Electoral Integrity Matters." Harvard Kennedy School. <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/why-electoral-integrity-matters>.

"Overview of Electoral Integrity." The Electoral Knowledge Network.

https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/ei10/mobile_browsing/onePag.

"The Integrity of Elections in Asia: Policy Lessons from Expert Evaluations." WILEY Online Library. Last modified September 3, 2018. Accessed August 31, 2023. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/aspp.12416>.

"Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity." Alliance of Democracies. <https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/transatlantic-commission-on-election-integrity/>.

"United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD)." The Electoral Knowledge Network. <https://aceproject.org/about-en/ace-partners/UNEAD>.

"UN peacekeepers help provide security as Central African Republic holds elections." United Nations. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/un-peacekeepers-help-provide-security-central-african-republic-holds-elections>.

"Voting Rights: A Short History." Carnegie Corporation of New York. Last modified November 18, 2019. Accessed August 31, 2023. <https://www.carnegie.org/our-work/article/voting-rights-timeline/>.